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The European Union and the Promotion of Good Governance in its Near Abroad –
One Size Fits All?
Tanja A. Börzel/Yasemin Pamuk/Andreas Stahn
Abstract
With the end of the Cold War, states and international organisations have systematically 
mainstreamed good governance in their development strategies for third countries. The Eu-
ropean Union is no exception. The promotion of good governance ranks particularly high in 
the EU’s “near abroad”, which has become a focal point for EU foreign policy making since 
the 2004/2006 enlargement rounds. This paper seeks to systematically compare the EU’s ap-
proach to promoting good governance in the Southern Caucasus.  Armenia, Azerbaijan, and 
Georgia are equally marked by bad governance. Arbitrary rule and pervasive corruption are 
common in all three countries. Nonetheless, they significantly vary with regard to the degree 
of statehood, and the quality of the political regime. Our aim is to explore to what extent these 
variations have affected the EU’s strategy of promoting good governance. Looking at the Eu-
ropean Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), a rather recent policy framework, we seek to give some 
answers to the question whether the EU sticks to a “one-size-fits-all” approach, or whether it 
has started to practice some differential treatment.
Zusammenfassung
Seit dem Ende des Kalten Krieges haben Staaten und internationale Organisationen die För-
derung „Guten Regierens“ systematisch in ihre Entwicklungshilfestrategien integriert. Die 
EU ist dabei keine Ausnahme. Durch die EU-Osterweiterung und die Verschiebung ihrer 
Grenzen nach Osten spielt die Förderung von Good Governance eine besonders gewichtige 
Rolle in der neuen Nachbarschaft der EU. Dieser Beitrag stellt einen systematischen Ver-
gleich der EU Good Governance Förderung im Südkaukasus an. Armenien, Aserbaidschan 
und Georgien sind gleichermaßen von „Bad Governance“ betroffen. Willkürliches politisches 
Handeln und weit verbreitete Korruption sind alltäglich in allen drei Ländern. Gleichwohl 
unterscheiden sie sich mit Blick auf den Grad an Staatlichkeit und die Qualität des politischen 
Regimes. Unser Ziel ist zu untersuchen, ob und auf welche Weise diese Varianz sich auf EU 
Good Governance Förderung auswirkt. Unseren Fokus legen wir dabei auf die relativ junge 
Europäische Nachbarschaftspolitik und die Frage, wie viel Differenzierung dieses gemein-
same Dachkonzept zulässt. 
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Abbreviations
ACP African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States
AEPLAC Armenian European Policy and Legal Advice Centre
AP Action Plan
AZPLAC Azerbaijan Policy and Legal Advice Centre
BTI Bertelsmann Transformation Index
CEEC Central Eastern European Countries
CoE Council of Europe
CSP Country Strategy Paper
DG Directorate General
ECHO European Community Humanitarian Aid Office
EIDHR European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights 
ENP European Neighbourhood Policy
ENPI European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument
EU European Union
FSP Food Security Programme
GEPLAC Georgian European Policy and Legal Advice Centre
GoAZ Government of Azerbaijan
GRECO Group of States Against Corruption
INOGATE Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe
NGO Non Governmental Organisation
NIP National Indicative Programme
NIS Newly Independent State
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PCA Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
REC Regional Environmental Centre for Central and Eastern Europe
GoAM Government of Armenia
TACIS Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States
TI Transparency International
TRACECA Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNTOC United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime
WTO World Trade Organisation
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1. Introduction1
With the end of the Cold War, states and international organisations have systematically main-
streamed good governance in their development strategies for third countries. The European 
Union is no exception. In fact, the EU has been among the first to include good governance, 
together with human rights, democracy, and the rule of law in its cooperation agreements with 
external partners.
In this paper we aim at shedding light on how the EU is promoting good governance in the 
Southern Caucasus. More specifically we ask whether the EU pursues a “one-size-fits-all” ap-
proach or whether it has developed strategies “tailored to each country’s specific circumstances” 
(European Commission 2004a: 14) that go beyond the regional framework of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Furthermore our aim is to explore in which way these specific 
circumstances do have an impact on the EU’s strategy of promoting good governance.
In order to explore these questions, we focus on Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. The three 
countries are situated in the Southern Caucasus, which formed part of the former Soviet Union. 
It is important to note that compared to other post-communist regions, such as the Central 
Eastern European Countries (CEEC), the Southern Caucasus seriously suffers from bad gover-
nance. Arbitrary rule and pervasive corruption are common in all three countries. At the same 
time, however, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia do vary with regard to the degree of statehood, 
the quality of the political regime, and their economic conditions. We argue that the different 
configurations on the ground may result in different opportunity structures that influence how 
and with whom the EU promotes good governance.
Our analysis will show that the EU applies a two-pronged strategy with regard to its eastern 
neighbourhood. It adopts a “one-size-fits-all” approach in the general policy framework that 
is spelled out and complemented by a country specific component on the ground. Domestic 
factors, such as the degree of statehood and the quality of democracy, result in significant vari-
ations in the EU’s strategy of promoting good governance.
To state our argument, the first part of our paper develops an analytical framework that identi-
fies four ideal types of good governance approaches available to the EU. In addition, we discuss 
various instruments and influence mechanisms through which good governance can be pro-
moted. Drawing on the few existing studies of governance export by external actors, we then 
formulate a set of expectations as to which good governance approach the EU is likely to choose 
when dealing with countries that differ with regard to statehood, democracy and economic de-
velopment. We assume that on the regional level the EU follows a “one-size-fits-all” approach. 
On the country level, however, we expect the EU to adapt its strategies with regard to the specific 
1 We thank Stephen Krasner, Thomas Risse, Vera van Hüllen and the anonymous reviewer for helpful 
comments and suggestions. 
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conditions on the ground. In addition, the EU should also react to significant changes in the 
country context.
The second part will explore to what extent our expectations hold. We will analyse the EU’s 
good governance approach with regard to its eastern neighbourhood in general and the three 
countries of the Southern Caucasus in particular. Our findings show that the EU does indeed 
apply a “one-size-fits-all” approach to good governance on the regional level. On the country-
level, this general approach is to some extent mitigated by the specific country context in which 
good governance is being promoted. Armenia and Georgia confirm our assumptions regarding 
the link between the domestic regime-type and statehood of the target country, on the one 
hand, and the good governance approach of the EU, on the other. By contrast, the case of Azer-
baijan does not match our expectations. In this case, the EU refrains from adequately adapting 
to Azerbaijan’s poor governance performance, which may be due to the supremacy of energy 
interests and a lack of leverage. Our paper concludes with a summary of our most important 
findings and points to some avenues for future research.
2. Promoting Good Governance – Towards an Analytical Framework
2.1 Unpacking Good Governance
While good governance has gained prominence in the literature, there is little agreement on 
the essence of the concept. The various definitions scholars use depend mostly on their respec-
tive research agenda or on their understanding of the actor under scrutiny. In order to struc-
ture the existing literature on good governance, we have developed an analytical framework 
that adopts a broad understanding of governance as institutionalised modes of coordination 
through which collectively binding decisions are adopted and implemented (Mayntz/Scharpf 
1995; Scharpf 1997). This definition does not confine governance to the non-hierarchical coor-
dination of public and private actors (Rhodes 1999) but also encompasses hierarchical steering 
through public actors only as well as private self-regulation. Furthermore, governance entails 
an albeit minimal normative dimension for it refers to institutionalised modes of coordination 
that intentionally aim at the provision of (basic) collective goods rather than serving individu-
al self-interests (Ladwig/Jugov/Schmelzle 2007). Good governance has even deeper normative 
implications. In the following, we distinguish two main analytical dimensions found in the 
literature that enable us to better grasp the different concepts of good governance.
Input or output legitimacy?
A first analytical cut can be made by distinguishing different normative contents of good go-
vernance. One part of the literature associates good governance with the setting of a sound ad-
ministrative and regulatory framework mainly provided by the state (Adam 2001; Fuster 1998). 
This notion prevails in studies that are informed by developmental considerations and largely 
concentrate on output criteria such as efficiency and effectiveness. Accordingly, most authors 
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implicitly or explicitly conceive of the core principles of good governance as transparency and 
efficiency, which translate into sound public financial management or the fight against corrup-
tion – principles that aim at making policies more predictable and effective (cf. Conzelmann 
2003; Fuster 1998; Hill 2006).
However, many scholars and practitioners attach a wider political connotation to good gover-
nance (Tolentino 1995) that also places emphasis on the involvement of societal actors as part of 
the political process (Adam 2001). Scholars working in the field of democratisation and external 
democracy promotion go a step further by focussing on more demanding principles relating to 
the input-dimension of good governance, such as the respect for human rights and democracy 
(cf. McFaul 2004-2005; Carothers 2004; Burnell 2000). Both perspectives are linked by paying 
attention to the rule of law as a safeguard of institutions in both dimensions (König 2001; Ma-
gen/Morlino 2008).
We adopt a broad perspective on good governance that integrates the two strands of literature. 
Using the prism of legitimacy as an analytical tool, we can systematically order the various 
definitions and understandings of good governance. In a first step, our analytical framework 
draws on the distinction between the two aspects of legitimacy that were formulated by Fritz 
W. Scharpf – input and output legitimacy (Scharpf 1999). Output legitimacy corresponds to the 
narrow (regulatory) understanding in the developmental literature, whereas input legitimacy 
is equated with the wider (political) concept of good governance dominant in the literature on 
democratisation and democracy promotion.
In other words, output legitimacy refers to the extent to which the effects of political decisions 
are perceived to be in the interest of the people. In this view, good governance is about solving 
societal problems in an effective and efficient manner. Input legitimacy, by contrast, requires 
political decisions to correspond to the preferences of affected people. Accordingly, good gover-
nance must ensure that the preferences of the people are translated into political decisions.
State or civil society?
The second analytical cut concerns the role of the state in relation to that of civil society in 
promoting good governance. The emergence of good governance in the development debate 
at the end of the 1980s basically marks nothing less than a shift in paradigm from “getting 
the market right” to ”getting the institutions right” (cf. Fuster 1998; Menzel 1995: 43ff.). The 
idea behind this is that the creation of a regulative environment is a decisive precondition for 
achieving sustainable development. It further aims at the effective and purposeful management 
of primarily economic resources. Moreover, when it comes to delivering and safeguarding the 
rules of the game and managing public resources, the literature implicitly or explicitly refers to 
the existence of a more or less functioning state (Hill 2006; Theobald 2001). Consequently, the 
state and its administrative capacities play a crucial role in the good governance debate (Dolzer 
2004; Murphy 2002; Pierre 1999).
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Simultaneously, there is growing scholarly interest in the role of non-state actors in gover-
nance. On the one hand, state failure and the absence of hierarchy in international politics rai-
sed the question whether “new modes of governance”, i.e. patterns of cooperation between state 
and non-state actors, offer an alternative to hierarchical and monopolised decision-making 
(Risse/Lehmkuhl 2007). The main assumption of this kind of research is that the pooling of re-
sources of state and non-state actors such as interest organisations or private businesses might 
contribute to an efficient, effective, and even inclusive formulation and implementation of coll-
ectively binding norms (Héritier 2003). Moreover, non-state actors can foster the legitimacy of 
governance, “hold governments accountable” and “form the base upon which a truly democratic 
political culture can be built” (Ottaway/Carothers 2000: 4). Thus, the literature on international 
democracy promotion focuses on the specific role of non-governmental organisations, political 
parties, and independent media as well as prospects and limitations to strengthen such (dome-
stic) actors from the outside (cf. Mendelson/Glenn 2002; Carothers 2006; Raik 2006).
Thus, depending on which actors they focus on, external actors seeking to promote good gover-
nance may use two different channels of influence (Schimmelfennig 2007; Diez/Stetter/Albert 
2006). They can choose the way of “intergovernmental interaction”, or they can seek to trigger 
and influence domestic reform processes “through transnational processes via societal actors 
in the target state” (Schimmelfennig 2007: 6). Using the intergovernmental channel, external ac-
tors either hope to alter the preferences of target governments over strategies by manipulating 
their cost benefit calculation, or they aim to change preferences of outcomes of governments 
by socialising them into new norms through processes of social learning and persuasion. The 
transnational approach targets domestic non-state actors in order to empower them vis-à-vis 
their governments in pushing for political reforms (Schimmelfennig 2007: 7).
We expect that it is the specific political setting of the target state that matters most for the 
actual choice of approaches and instruments by external actors. The next section identifies the 
approaches and instruments available for promoting good governance.
2.2 Approaches and Instruments of Good Governance Promotion
Based on the two dimensions described in the previous section, we can now develop an analyti-
cal framework in order to qualify the EU’s attempt to improve the governance structures and 
processes in third countries across country and over time. Accordingly, we assume that the EU, 
on the one hand, can choose between different contents of good governance – placing stronger 
emphasis on either input or output related reform goals. On the other hand, the EU can invoke 
different channels of influence, either targeting the intergovernmental channel (state actors) or 
the transnational channel (non-state actors). Combining these two analytical foci, we arrive at 
a two-by-two matrix that allows us to differentiate between four ideal-type approaches of good 
governance promotion available to the EU.
One Size Fits All? |  10
The first approach of effective government addresses the intergovernmental channel and seeks to 
promote output-oriented objectives, focusing on the administrative core of good governance. 
This essentially entails improving governance through strengthening the government and its 
administration. The second approach of effective governance places emphasis on output-oriented
reform goals as well. It either aims at including non-state actors in the implementation process 
in order to produce better policies by pooling resources and increasing acceptance, or it tackles 
the building and strengthening of non-state organisations that help better implement poli-
cies. The third approach of democratic government again relies on the intergovernmental channel. 
While promoting input-oriented objectives, however, the EU targets the state to have it establish 
and safeguard a public sphere in which interests can be articulated and aggregated. The fourth 
approach of democratic governance, finally, combines the transnational channel with input-orien-
ted reform objectives. This approach wants to empower non-state actors in the making of pu-
blic policies in order to improve the democratic quality of decision-making processes.Figure 1 
summarises the available types of good governance approaches:
Figure 1: Four approaches of external good governance promotion
Output Input
Intergovernmental effective government democratic government
Transnational effective governance democratic governance
In analysing the EU’s strategy of good governance promotion, a final distinction can be made 
with regard to the instruments external actors employ to make their targets (state or non-state 
actors) comply with their major goals (increasing input or output legitimacy). 
With the mainstreaming of good governance into the foreign policy of international organisa-
tions and western states, compliance with external requirements has increasingly become an 
issue. The so called “management school” indeed emphasises lacking capacities as the main 
problem of compliance, which can be addressed by transferring financial and technical resour-
ces (Chayes/Chayes 1993; Chayes/Chayes/Mitchell 1998). Enforcement theories, by contrast, con-
tend that states predominantly lack the will to comply with external requirements since they 
imply high costs, both economic and political. External actors can either induce recalcitrant 
states into compliance by offering negative (sanctions) and positive (rewards) incentives (Downs 
1998; Fearon 1998), or they can seek to change their preferences through socialisation processes 
based on persuasion and social learning (Checkel 2001; Risse 1999).
Accordingly, external actors may draw on three types of instruments to promote good gover-
nance in third countries. These instruments differ mainly with regard to the steering mecha-
nisms by which good governance is being diffused. First, political dialogue uses persuasion and 
learning strategies. Second, conditionality tries to manipulate cost-benefit calculations through 
creating positive and negative incentives. Finally, assistance is geared toward capacity building 
for institutionalizing good governance. The following figure summarises the set of instruments 
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and the corresponding (dominant) mechanism of influence generally available to external ac-
tors:
Figure 2: The tool box for external action
Instrument Mechanism of Influence
Assistance capacity and institution building
Conditionality manipulation of cost-benefit calculations
Political Dialogue social learning and persuasion 
We assume that the four good governance approaches can be combined with all instruments 
available in the tool box for external action. We expect, however, that the EU’s approach to pro-
mote good governance is shaped by the political setting in the target country.
2.3 Promoting Good Governance in Different Country Settings
The literature on development cooperation has shown that the strategy of external actors to-
wards third countries is inter alia influenced by the “capacity of government to formulate and 
implement policies and discharge government functions” and the “form of political regime” 
(OECD/DAC 1995: 16). Likewise, we expect statehood, i.e. the capacity of state institutions to de-
velop and implement policies and to perform regulative functions on the one hand, and demo-
cracy, that is the extent to which the political process is based on the principles of accountability 
and inclusiveness on the other, to significantly shape the concepts, channels and instruments 
applied by the EU in its external relations in order to promote good governance.
We argue that bad governance in its different manifestations motivates the EU to promote good 
governance in the first place. Therefore the main target of good governance promotion are 
countries, in which informal institutions and high-level corruption pervade domestic decision-
making processes and prevent societies to profit from the virtues of effective and legitimate gov-
ernance.Corruptionandarbitrary rule are detrimental to a competitive market economy, impair 
socio-economic development, and deter foreign investment (Rose-Ackerman 1996; Mauro 1995; 
Frank 2004). Moreover, they undermine the political and public institutions in a democratic 
state by favouring certain parts of the population and excluding others from political processes 
(Johnston 1999, 2005; Kitschelt/Wilkinson 2007; Karklins 2005). Finally, the existence of perva-
sive corruption has a corrosive effect on the territorial integrity of the state and the political 
community itself, bearing the danger of social unrest (civil war) and state collapse (UNDP 2006; 
cf. Shen/Wiliamson 2005; Scott 1972). Given its paramount negative impact on the political, eco-
nomic and societal institutions of a state, corruption is often considered to lie at the heart of 
bad governance (Spinellis 1996; Phongpaichit/Baker 2002). In these settings, good governance 
promotion either aims at strengthening the capacities of the state to effectively fight corrup-
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tion, or it seeks to promote participation and civil oversight over the allocation of resources, 
thus affecting the relationship between the government and its citizens (Karklins 2005).
The approaches and instruments the EU chooses may depend on the capacity and willingness 
of third countries to overcome bad governance. Capacity directly relates to statehood for it refers 
to the material and immaterial resources a government can draw on to adopt and enforce po-
licy changes necessary to effectively improve governance. The willingness to introduce relevant 
political reforms may be influenced, in turn, by the degree of democratisation a country has rea-
ched, such as the extent to which governments rely on clientelistic networks to remain in power 
(Treisman 2000; Khan 2006; Vorozheikina 1994).2
Statehood and democracy provide an opportunity structure for the EU’s good governance ap-
proach. Since the EU generally prioritises state-building over democracy promotion (Kopstein 
2005; Jünemann/Knodt 2007),3 the domestic structure of the target country should mostly cons-
train or favour the channels through which the EU seeks to promote its development goals, 
which include effective rather than legitimate institutions. 
Based on these considerations, we expect the EU to focus on the promotion of democratic gover-
nance when dealing with countries which are authoritarian (weak democracy) but have sufficient 
capacities to adopt and enforce policies (strong statehood), such as Belarus. In these settings, 
bad governance is a result of formal institutions that bypass main principles of good gover-
nance such as transparency, accountability, the rule of law and participative decision-making. 
In order to undermine authoritarian rule, the EU seeks the cooperation with actors beyond the 
state. However, opportunities for supporting non-state actors are seriously constrained by the 
repressive nature of the regime. Thus, the EU’s influence on governance appears to be most 
limited for countries facing the biggest problems of bad governance.
Second, if countries score low on both democracy and statehood (e.g. many ACP), the EU is 
most likely to pursue an approach of effective governance. This does not only entail support for 
government institutions; the EU also seeks to involve the material and immaterial resources of 
non-state actors to increase the effectiveness of governance-related reforms. At the same time, 
the EU is unlikely to push for democratic reforms (input legitimacy) in order not to destabilise 
the country even further (cf. Jünemann/Knodt 2007).
2 For the counterargument cf. Manzetti (2007).
3 The EU’s bias towards promoting stability and order over regime change is deeply entrenched in its 
external relations with third countries, particularly the ACP. Traditionally, the EU’s attempts to pro-
mote (good) governance have focused on capacity-building in the public sector through granting (un-
conditional) financial and technical assistance. The emphasis on state-building has been reinforced 
through the eastern and south eastern (West Balkan) enlargement processes where the EU’s strategy 
has been “designed to stabilize countries that are already democratic rather than to promote regime 
change in nondemocracies” (Kopstein 2005: 91). Cf. Börzel/Pamuk/Stahn (2007); Börzel/Risse (forth-
coming).
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Third, democratic regimes whose statehood is limited (e.g. Bosnia-Herzegovina) are primarily 
subject to the promotion of effective government since the major challenge is to strengthen the 
capacity of state-institutions to adopt and enforce political reform in order to improve gover-
nance.
Finally, we expect the EU to focus on the promotion of democratic government when dealing with 
countries which are comparatively advanced in their democratisation process and whose capa-
city to hierarchically adopt and enforce policies is sufficiently developed (e.g. CEEC). The EU 
will seek to further strengthen the effectiveness and legitimacy of the reform-minded govern-
ment in their attempts to improve governance.
Figure 3 summarises our expectations with regard to the EU’s approach in different country 
settings. The next section will explore to what extent our expectations hold in the framework of 
the European Neighbourhood Policy towards the Southern Caucasus.
Figure 3: Statehood, democracy, and good governance approaches
Autocracy Democracy
intact statehood democratic governance democratic government
limited statehood effective governance effective government
3. Good Governance in the European Neighbourhood
3.1 One Size Fits All…
With the end of the Cold War, good governance has been mainstreamed into the development 
strategies of international organisations, such as the World Bank, UNDP and the OECD. The 
same is true for individual Western states, such as the United States or the Federal Republic of 
Germany (Adam 2001; Hill 2006; Weiss 2000).
The European Union is no exception. It has been among the first actors to write good gover-
nance – together with human rights, democracy, and the rule of law – into its agreements with 
third countries. The promotion of good governance is an integral part of the EU’s foreign policy 
and is supported with considerable financial and human resources.
Since good governance originated within international development cooperation, the concept 
entered the EU through this gateway and quickly spread into other policy areas. Moreover, it 
was the DG Development of the European Commission that took the lead in further developing 
the concept and mainstreaming it into the EU’s external relations (for further details cf. Bör-
zel/Pamuk/Stahn 2007). Initially, the EU started with a narrow concept of good governance that 
essentially focused on effective government, separating it from political principles such as human 
rights and democracy (Beck/Conzelmann 2004). Yet, since in many developing countries the 
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state has been weak or largely absent, the Cotonou Agreement of 2000 opened a transnational 
channel by making the participation of non-state actors in EU development cooperation a for-
mal objective.
While EU development policy has increasingly moved towards promoting effective and to some 
extent even democratic governance, its enlargement and pre-accession policies have focused on 
strengthening effective and democratic government by focusing conditionality and assistance 
mainly on state actors (cf. Börzel/Pamuk/Stahn 2007).
The European Neighbourhood Policy falls in-between development and enlargement policy. 
It has been proposed by the Commision in response to the geographical and political changes 
during the course of the EU’s Eastern enlargement in 2004. In order to turn the “near abroad” 
into a “ring of friends” (European Commission 2003a), the EU has heavily drawn on the policies 
that had proven so successful in promoting ‘good governance’ in the CEEC (Kelley 2005). There 
are, however, major limitations, the most important of which is the absence of a membership 
perspective for the countries concerned. Thus, the ENP is the attempt to externally induce mo-
dernisation and, to some extent, democratisation processes without offering the incentive that 
proved key in the enlargement process (Magen 2006). 
The EU has evolved and institutionalised its relations with the “eastern” dimension of the ENP 
in four steps since 1991.4 Each step has envisaged a deepening of relations with the successor 
states of the Soviet Union including those of the Southern Caucasus. The set of instruments at 
the EU’s disposal subsequently expanded from mere technical assistance at the beginning of 
the 1990s to a comprehensive toolkit for external action a decade later. Lastly, the EU’s insis-
tence on improving governance and fighting corruption in the respective countries has also 
increased significantly over the past 15 years. 
After the break up of the Soviet Union, the EU quickly recognised the independence of its 
successor states – including Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. In order to support the Newly 
Independent States (NIS) in coping with the consequences of the ‘triple’ transition (Offe 1991), 
the EU initially concentrated on the provision of financial and technical assistance through 
the TACIS programme.5 TACIS covered a wide range of issues, such as support for privatisation 
processes and the development of the private sector as well as the reform of the public admi-
nistration, of education and social services, of the transport, energy, agricultural and telecom-
munication sector or nuclear safety and environmental policies.6
4 For the southern dimension see Bicchi (2006).
5 The Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States programme included Arme-
nia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, 
Uzbekistan and Russia. Mongolia joined the programme from 1993-2003.
6 Further EU programmes addressing the NIS are loans of the European Investment Bank, assistance by 
the European Community Humanitarian Aid department (ECHO), the Food Security Programme (FSP) as 
well as direct assistance to NGOs within the scope of the European Initiative (since 2006 Instrument) for 
Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR).
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In a second step, the EU sought to formalise its relations with the TACIS countries. By 1999 al-
together nine bilateral Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) had entered into force. 
With minor variations, these agreements were designed to further support the transition of the 
NIS to full-fledged market economies and, to a lesser extent, to liberal democracies. The forma-
lisation of relations brought about a significant change with regard to the instruments of the 
EU. Similar to its other regional foreign policy frameworks, the EU established a regular poli-
tical dialogue at different levels and formulated conditionality criteria. While both democracy 
and human rights are subject to negative conditionality and an explicit goal of the PCAs, good 
governance is not.7 Assistance through TACIS remained in place and completed the toolkit of 
the EU. It primarily aimed at supporting the implementation of the PCAs through capacity 
building measures. On the whole, the PCAs covered similar cooperation issues and areas.8In
2000, a new TACIS regulation9 further elaborated on the objectives stipulated in the PCAs. It 
continued to provide mainly for the intergovernmental channel and focused on supporting ef-
fective rather than inclusive policy making. In sum, the predecessor policies of the ENP sought 
to enhance effective government.
Eastern enlargement triggered the third step in the evolution of the external promotion of 
good governance in the NIS. The European Neighbourhood Policy can be understood as an 
attempt of the EU to provide financial and economic incentives in order to facilitate ambitious 
economic and political reforms in the post-Soviet countries. Jointly agreed Action Plans (AP) 
that copy the logic of the accession partnerships in the EU’s enlargement policy are at the ins-
titutional core of the ENP. The APs formulate short and medium term reform priorities, the 
implementation of which is monitored and discussed regularly in the political dialogue. Those 
countries that fulfil these obligations may be rewarded with closer cooperation, for instance, 
through lifting trade restrictions or simplified visa regimes. Negative conditionality, by con-
trast, is not part of the AP, but the EU refers to the common values stipulated by the respective 
clauses of the PCAs.
Unlike the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, the Action Plans – though to varying de-
grees (see country studies) – refer to good governance as specific objectives of the cooperation 
between the EU and the partner governments in the Southern Caucasus. Moreover, since 2004, 
the EU started to require ENP partner governments to consult and cooperate with non-state 
actors and civil organisations in the formulation and implementation of the national reform 
agendas (Cf. European Commission 2004a; European Commission 2006b; European Commis-
sion 2007d). This can be interpreted as a cautious opening of the transnational channel. 
7 Cf. for example Title I, VII and XI of the PCA with Armenia or Title I, VII, XI of the PCA with Geor-
gia.
8 The only major differences between the agreements with Armenia and Azerbaijan for instance are 
three additional articles regarding the construction sector (Art. 47), enterprise restructuring and priva-
tisation (Art. 60), and monetary policy (Art. 70) in the PCA of the latter. Interestingly, in the context of 
privatisation the EU explicitly emphasises the importance of transparency. Cf. PCA Azerbaijan.
9 Council Regulation No. 99/2000 of 29 December 1999.
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In a fourth and most recent step, the EU has replaced its old assistance programme TACIS with 
a new financial instrument. In 2007, the so-called European Neighbourhood and Partnership 
Instrument (ENPI)10 was introduced to specifically address the needs of the ENP. Unlike TACIS, 
the ENPI regulation defines good governance as a central commitment on which the partner-
ships are based (Art. 2.1) and as an explicit goal of assistance (Art. 2.2 (d)). With regard to the 
policy objectives, the ENPI regulation states: 
“Community Assistance under the Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument shall 
promote enhanced cooperation and progressive economic integration between the Euro-
pean Union and the partner countries and, in particular, the implementation of partner-
ship and cooperation agreements […]” (Art. 2).
It also underlines that EU assistance shall rely on the principle of co-financing and shall be ba-
sed on a cooperation partnership with beneficiaries (Art. 2). In contrast to the TACIS regulation 
of 1999, ENPI addresses transnational channels of cooperation stating that “partnership will 
involve, as appropriate, national, regional and local authorities, economic and social partners, 
civil society and other relevant bodies” (Art. 4 (c)). In addition to the use of transnational chan-
nels of influence, the regulation also requires the beneficiary partner governments to “associate 
the relevant partners as appropriate, in particular at regional an local level, in the preparation, 
implementation and monitoring of programmes and projects” (Art. 4 (d)). With the introduc-
tion of ENPI that officially replaced the TACIS programme in January 2007, the EU has also 
changed its strategy regarding the delivery modality of its development assistance. While TACIS 
had been provided primarily through jointly managed projects, ENPI has replaced the project 
logic by a ‘sector-wide’ approach allocating the assistance by means of direct budgetary aid to 
the partner governments.
In a nutshell, good governance has increasingly gained prominence in the EU’s policy towards 
its neighbours, particularly those in the east. Likewise, non-state actors have been subsequently 
“upgraded”. However, unlike in the EU’s development policy, they have not received the sta-
tus of official partners. Moreover, their involvement – whether of civil society organisations or 
business – aims at increasing the public institutions’ efficiency and effectiveness rather than 
to head for the “democratic quality” of the reform process. Thus, ENP continues to be biased 
towards effective government although some changes towards effective governance are underway. 
Finally, the EU has expanded its toolkit for the promotion of good governance. Assistance has 
been subsequently complemented by conditionality and political dialogue. Figure 4 summa-
rises our findings with regard to the EU’s expanding good governance approach in its Eastern 
neighbourhood.
10   Council Regulation No. 1638/2006 of 24 October 2006.
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Figure 4: Phases of the EU’s good governance promotion
Concepts Channels Instruments
1991-2006
TACIS & 
EIDHR
output-oriented
Intergovernmental
(transnational in case 
of EIDHR)
assistance
1997- PCA output-oriented intergovernmental
political dialogue
negative conditionality 
(essential elements)
2004- AP
predominantly 
output-oriented
predominantly 
intergovernmental
political dialogue
positive conditionality 
(increased economic integration  
and political cooperation)
2007- 
ENPI & 
EIDHR
predominantly 
output-oriented
predominantly 
intergovernmental
(transnational in case 
of EIDHR)
assistance
political dialogue
positive conditionality 
(further allocations depending  
on reform progress)
negative conditionality 
(suspension clause)
Over the last 15 years, the EU has mainstreamed good governance into its external relations and 
developed a universal toolkit for its promotion. In the next section, we will explore in detail to 
what extent the EU’s “one-size-fits-all” approach has given way to a more differential treatment. 
Although the Southern Caucasus in general belongs to the group of states with weak statehood 
and democracy (cf. chapter 2), at a closer look Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia differ with re-
gard to their governance structures; as a result we expect the EU to pursue some differential 
treatment on the ground. 
3.2 … or Towards Differential Treatment?
The breakdown of the Soviet Union brought Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia face-to-face to 
enormous political, economic and social challenges. Widespread poverty and regional conflicts 
have contributed to political instability and economic decline. By the end of the 1990s, it had 
become clear that the Newly Independent States performed much worse than other post-com-
munist countries in Central Eastern Europe, with regard to both economic and political transi-
tion. The main reason for this gap is attributed to bad governance (Carothers 2002).
Most of the NIS, including Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, have belonged to the group of 
highly corrupt countries. In fact, the Corruption Perceptions Index of Transparency Internati-
onal (TI) has repeatedly ranked the three Southern Caucasus states among the most corrupt in 
the world (cf. figure 5).
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Figure 5: Corruption in the Southern Caucasus
TI Corruption Perceptions Index Armenia Georgia Azerbaijan
2004 (rank out of 146 countries) 3.1 (82.) 2.0 (133.) 1.9 (140.) 
2007 (rank out of 179 countries) 2.9 (93.) 2.8 (99.) 2.4 (130.)
The scale ranges from 0 (high corruption) to 10 (low corruption). 
Source: Transparency International 2004, 2007.
Both “grand” corruption (misuse of political power) and “petty” corruption (misuse of admi-
nistrative competences) are common in all three countries. Nonetheless, Armenia, Azerbaijan 
and Georgia differ with regard to the forms of corruption. The World Bank rates Armenia as a 
country with medium state capture and high administrative corruption (cf. World Bank 2000). 
In contrast, Azerbaijan and Georgia are described as countries with high levels of administra-
tive corruption as well as state capture. At least in the case of Georgia there have been some 
improvements since 2000, in particular with regard to the reduction of corruption in the lower 
law enforcement agencies. The high level of corruption found in the three states correspond to 
the overall assessment of the World Bank Governance Index, which identifies major governance 
failures in all three countries. Azerbaijan appears to be in most urgent need of improving gover-
nance. Armenia and Georgia perform better, albeit on a comparatively low level.
Figure 6: Governance in the Southern Caucasus
World Bank Governance Indicators Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia
Government Effectiveness
Governance Score (-2.5 to +2.5) -0.16 -0.7 -0.16
Percentile Rank (0-100) 51.2 27.5 50.7
Regulatory Quality
Governance Score (-2.5 to +2.5) 0.26 -0.44 -0.22
Percentile Rank (0-100) 59.0 34.1 44.4
Rule of Law
Governance Score (-2.5 to +2.5) -0.52 -0.86 -0.61
Percentile Rank (0-100) 38.1 22.4 32.9
Control of Corruption
Governance Score (-2.5 to +2.5) -0.58 -0.99 -0.36
Percentile Rank (0-100) 35 15.0 44.7
Source: Kaufmann et al. 2007.
Overall, there is still a huge gap between the expectations of the EU and the performance of the 
three countries in fighting corruption. As a result, anti-corruption policies should figure pro-
minently in the EU’s good governance approach towards the Southern Caucasus. Hence, while, 
given their extremely high levels of corruption and bad governance, the functional demand for 
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promoting good governance is equally strong , the three countries differ with regard to state-
hood and democracy.
Measuring statehood and its limitations, i.e. the degree to which the monopoly on the use of 
force and the capacity to hierarchically adopt and enforce collectively binding decisions are 
compromised, is rather difficult. Most indices do not restrict their focus on the capacity of 
the state to effectively formulate and implement policies, but also include normative aspects 
regarding the content of state policies (e.g. World Bank Governance Indicators or Bertelsmann 
Transformation Index (BTI)). Moreover, the results regarding the strength of the monopoly on 
the use of force are distorted by the existence of “renegade territories” as for example in the 
cases of Azerbaijan and Georgia. According to the BTI stateness index, for instance, Azerbaijan 
and Georgia’s overall score is comparatively low due to the frozen conflicts within their terri-
tories. In particular, the scores of the first (monopoly on the use of force) and the fourth (basic 
administration) dimension of statehood appear to be skewed (cf. figure 9). This implies that, 
while the two states are not in control of the “renegade” regions, their capacities to deploy coer-
cive power may be intact in their remaining territories.
Figure 7: Statehood in the Southern Caucasus11
BTI index stateness 
with sub-dimensions 
Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia
Overall 8,8 6,8 5,3
Monopoly on use of force 9 6 4
Citizenship agreement 9 6 5
No religious dogmas 9 9 8
Basic administration 8 6 4
Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2005.
If we discard the existence of territorial conflicts, the differences regarding the degree of state-
hood in the Southern Caucasus countries become less significant.12 Nevertheless, Armenia ap-
pears to have the most developed state institutions, followed by Azerbaijan and Georgia.
We find more variation between the three countries with regard to their democratic quality. 
Although in their formation phase, all three republics envisioned a western-style parliamentary 
democracy as the basis of their form of government, none of them can be considered a consoli-
dated democracy. The degree of the democratic progress, however, varies considerably between 
the three countries. Georgia has made the most progress, followed by Armenia and lastly Azer-
baijan (cf. figure 8).
11 The indicator “stateness” is part of the BTI Democracy Status. It includes the sub-indicators monopoly 
on the use of force, citizenship agreement, no religious dogma, basic administration.
12 For the purpose of this research project, we restrict our focus to those parts of the countries that are 
formally under control of the respective government.
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Figure 8: Democracy in the Southern Caucasus
Democracy indices Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia
FH Freedom in the World 
Index 2001
4/4 (partly free) 6/5 (partly free) 4/4 (partly free)
FH Freedom in the World 
Index 2006
5/4 (partly free) 6/5 (not free) 3/3 (partly free)
Economist Intelligence Unit
Democracy Index 2007
(rank out of 167)
4.15 (110)
“hybrid regime”
3.31 (129)  
“authoritarian regime”
4.9 (104)
“hybrid regime”
BTI Democracy Status
(rank out of 125)
6.0 (65)
“highly defective 
democracy”
3.8 (98)
“autocracy”
6.9 (42)
“defective democracy”
Sources: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2007; Freedom House 2008; Kekic 2007.
All three countries of the Southern Caucasus are in great need of improving governance. Com-
pared to the other two countries, Azerbaijan suffers most from corruption. Concurrently, its 
limited statehood and lack of democratic institutions increase the challenge for the EU. We 
expect the EU to pursue effective governance predominantly relying on assistance and political 
dialogue. Georgia, by contrast, appears to have become slightly less corrupt, its statehood is less 
intact, but it is more democratic than Azerbaijan and Armenia. According to our model, the EU 
should focus on strengthening effective government using conditionality as the main instrument 
in Georgia. With the Rose Revolution in 2003, Georgia improved with regard to both statehood 
and democracy. As a result, we would expect the EU to also promote democratic government. 
Armenia, finally, though the strongest performer in statehood, somewhat falls in between the 
other two countries with regard to the level of democracy. Thus, given the EU’s bias towards 
building state institutions, we are likely to see an effective government approach with a slight ten-
dency towards effective governance. However, the variance with regard to statehood and democra-
cy may not suffice to cover the entire range of possible approaches the EU may choose. A cross-
time comparison of individual countries may help us to increase the variance. For instance, in 
contrast to Armenia and Azerbaijan, the situation in Georgia varies considerably between 2002 
and 2007 with respect to democracy and statehood. Thus, we would expect the EU’s approach to 
adapt to the changing opportunity structure moving from its initial approach of predominantly 
promoting effective governance, as in the case of Azerbaijan, to effective government. Figure 9 
depicts our expectations with regard to the EU’s good governance approaches in the Southern 
Caucasus:
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Figure 9: Expectations with regard to EU good governance approaches in the Southern Caucasus
The next section will explore to what extent our expectations hold. We will systematically 
compare the approaches and instruments of EU good governance promotion in the Southern 
Caucasus across countries and over time.
Armenia
Since the breakdown of the Soviet Union, the EU has supported Armenia through a variety of 
assistance programmes. Starting with the introduction of its TACIS programme in 1991, the EU 
provided a total of € 386.39 million of assistance to the Republic of Armenia until December 
2006.13 The early period between 1991 and 1998 was mainly characterised by the severe crisis the 
Armenian economy underwent in the years following independence. Therefore, humanitarian 
assistance accounted for half of the total assistance in the early 1990s. Additionally, close to one 
third of the aid was allocated through the EU’s Food Security Programme initiated in 1996. In 
the first years of Armenia’s independence, the EU’s engagement mainly focused on institutional 
capacity-building in order to support the country’s “triple transition” (Offe 1991) in market, state 
and democracy. Funding was mostly provided to public institutions, such as the Central Bank 
of Armenia, national ministries (e.g. Ministries of Agriculture, Labour and Social Issues) and 
other government agencies. In sum, the EU’s first good governance approach was characterised 
by promoting effective government.
In 1999, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement further institutionalised the EU’s relations 
with Armenia. Within the new framework, the EU’s approach still remained output-oriented 
13 This amount includes TACIS national allocations (25.59%), the TACIS nuclear safety programme 
(7.51%), humanitarian aid under ECHO (17.80%), assistance from the European Agricultural Guidance 
and Guarantee Fund (12.98%), Food Security Programme (26.48%), macro-financial assistance (9.34%), 
and aid against the effects of the Russian Financial Crisis (0.39%). In addition, Armenia has benefited 
from the TACIS regional programmes on energy (INOGATE), transport (TRACECA), and environment 
(REC).
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and mainly addressed governmental institutions. However, the PCA introduced the instrument 
of political dialogue. Moreover, the stipulation of an “essential elements clause” made bilateral 
cooperation with the EU conditional on the respect for democratic principles, the rule of law, 
human rights and the consolidation of a market economy (Art. 2). Although the instrument of 
political dialogue significantly enriched the mechanisms of influence available to the EU, as-
sistance remained the primary instrument of the EU-Armenia relations.
In 2001, the Commission adopted a Country Strategy Paper (CSP) for the programming of TA-
CIS in Armenia covering the period of 2002-2006 (cf. European Commission 2001a). The CSP 
for the first time explicitly pointed to persisting problems of bad governance. With view to the 
EU policy objectives the document for instance stated “[i]t is paramount to establish a business 
climate conducive to foreign and domestic investments, removing all obstacles, and widespread 
corruption above all” (European Commission 2001a: 4). 
Under the CSP 2002-2006, institution and administrative capacity building as well as poverty 
reduction constituted the primary aims of the EU’s assistance to Armenia. This is also corro-
borated by the fact that the major share of the EU’s allocations for Armenia in this period was 
provided to the Armenian European Policy and Legal Advice Centre (AEPLAC), a project that 
had started in 2000 in order to assist the Armenian government in the approximation to the 
Acquis Communautaire (European Commission 2001a: 5). Next to the general conditionalities of 
democratic principles, human rights and the obligations set out in the PCA, the document also 
formulates country specific conditionalities such as the fulfilment of the commitments with 
regard to the Medzamor Nuclear Power Plant (European Commission 2001a: 23). Furthermore 
the political dialogue between the EU and Armenia mainly concentrated on issues related to the 
reform agenda as for example the decommissioning of the power plant (European Commission 
2001a: 4). 
The strong emphasis on effective government was mitigated to some extent by the second Nati-
onal Indicative Programme (NIP) covering the period from 2004-2006. The document explicitly 
referred to the Armenian government’s failure “to address the issue of promotion of the pri-
vate sector and good governance” (European Commission 2003c: 2). As a consequence, the NIP 
2004-2006 made stronger use of the transnational channel. This change in approach aimed at 
ensuring a “better awareness among Armenian civil society concerning values and principles 
underpinning PCA, securing their inputs in related reforms, and monitoring implementation” 
(European Commission 2003c: 7). Moreover assistance now also covered the issues of decen-
tralisation and local self-governance (European Commission 2003c: 9). The transnational ap-
proach was strengthened additionally by the specific conditionalities for assistance. Hence the 
document claimed “full support by authorities for capacity building in administration and civil 
society” (European Commission 2003c: 7). The focus on transnational actors was also covered 
in a direct manner, as TACIS support aimed at “[p]romoting a vibrant civil society” (European 
Commission 2003c: 15), which was a novelty in the Armenian case. At a closer look, however, the 
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use of the transnational channel continued to place strong emphasis on effectiveness rather 
than democracy.14
Overall, between 2002 and 2006 the EU’s strong effective government approach towards Armenia 
was slightly broadened to include effective governance as well . Assistance remained the primary 
instrument although political dialogue on specific reform issues was established. Over time 
conditionality with regard to the governance performance had been reinforced. However the 
EU did not make use of this instrument.
In the run-up to the introduction of the European Neighbourhood Policy, the Commission 
issued a Country Report on Armenia in 2005. Again this report expressed concerns about weak 
governance and particularly corruption in Armenia (European Commission 2005a). While asses-
sing positively that the government of Armenia had signed and ratified both the Conventions 
on Criminal Law and Civil Law of the Council of Europe and also acceded the Group of States 
Against Corruption (GRECO) in January 2004, the report criticised the Armenian government 
for not fully meeting international standards, particularly with regard to the prosecution and 
conviction for bribery and corruption-related offences (European Commission 2005a: 8). As a 
consequence the Commission demanded stronger state activities in the fight against corrup-
tion, in particular in the areas of civil service reform, tax and customs administration, money 
laundering and in the educational sector (European Commission 2005a).
Based on the Country Report, the ENP Action Plan15 was negotiated between the European 
Commission and the Government of Armenia in 2006. It introduced a list of eight priorities for 
action (cf. AP AM 2006) that specified the scope and objectives for the development coopera-
tion under ENP.16 Though not mentioning good governance explicitly, the AP displays several 
implicit governance-related objectives. It is noteworthy that the rule of law including the fight 
against fraud and corruption already constitute a prominent part of the first priority area (AP AM 
2006: 4). The respective reform objectives refer to the institutional strengthening of the rule of 
law and democratic institutions, specific actions involve legal and administrative reform of the 
judicial system, strengthening of the independence of the courts, and the separation of pow-
ers. Likewise, priority area one puts strong emphasis on the reform of the electoral code and 
administration as well as a review of the progress made with regard to the implementation of 
14 The Commission consistently voiced concern over the stalled democratisation process in Armenia 
and referred to the essential elements of the PCA as the foundation of the relations between Armenia 
and the EU (cf. European Commission 2001a, 2003c). However, the EU did neither apply conditionality 
with view to these principles nor did the programming of assistance reflect a particular emphasis on 
increasing input-legitimacy.
15 EU/Armenia Action Plan, adopted 14 November, 2006 [hereafter: AP AM 2006].
16 These include the strengthening of democratic structures and the rule of law, strengthening of the 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, economic development and poverty reduction, 
improvement of the investment climate and strengthening of the private sector, legal and regulatory 
harmonisation with EU standards (PCA implementation and Acquis), decommissioning of the MNPP 
and development of an energy strategy, peaceful solution of the Karabakh conflict, and regional coop-
eration.
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the National Anti-corruption Strategy and Action Plan.17 The remaining priority areas also bear 
strong, though indirect references to the principles of good governance.18
On the whole, the long-term goals and specific objectives formulated in the AP still place em-
phasis on the output dimension. Almost all measures put primary importance in addressing 
the objectives of increasing efficiency and effectiveness of state institutions. Classical input 
related issues, such as democracy and human rights, are addressed in a more diluted sense. The 
exception is the clear requirements of the AP regarding democratic elections, and the electoral 
code (AP AM 2006). While the main cooperation partner remains the state in general, and go-
vernment authorities in particular, the specific objectives as well as the targets outlined in the 
AP framework suggest a gradual change in the Commission’s intergovernmental strategy. On 
the one hand, the AP does not target the executive branch exclusively anymore. It also addresses 
the legislative and judicial bodies on the central level as well as local government. The separati-
on of powers on the horizontal as well as on the vertical level seems to have become a stronger 
issue in the EU-Armenian relations. On the other hand, the AP calls for the active involvement 
of non-state actors, civil society organizations as well as private sector associations in particular 
in implementing the national anti-corruption strategy, in improving the human rights record, 
in the resolution of the Karabakh conflict and with regard to education and environmental 
governance (AP AM 2006).
Assistance still represents the main instrument by which the Commission seeks to improve the 
reform process in Armenia. However, the project logic that was applied under TACIS has been 
replaced by a programme-oriented, “sector-wide” approach under ENPI that allocates assistance 
by means of direct budgetary aid to the partner governments strengthening the importance of 
political dialogue where the terms of EU assistance are negotiated. While the tranches of the 
budget aid programmes are based on performance-related ex-post conditionality, the EU has 
not made use of it as of yet. Thus, the greatest change related to the introduction of the ENP 
occurred with regard to the EU’s initial approach of promoting effective government, which was 
complemented with some elements of effective governanceanddemocratic government.
The dominance of assistance among the instruments for external action is also prevalent in 
the ENPI. Since the introduction of the new financial instrument, assistance levels for Armenia 
have risen considerably. The indicative budget for 2007-2010 allocates € 98.4 million.
17 This state programme is a requirement of the GRECO membership obligations of the Republic of Ar-
menia. The draft of the state programme was financed by the World Bank. The GoAM Anti-corruption 
Strategy and Action Plan was adopted end of 2003.
18 Area number two for instance addresses the institutional reform of the police in order to eliminate 
mistreatment and corruption (public sector management: fight against corruption), area number three 
targets capacity building of administrative structures and procedures to ensure strategic planning 
(public sector management: efficiency & effectiveness), area number four envisions institutional re-
form of the tax and customs administration systems and collection (public sector management: trans-
parency & exchange of information, efficiency, effectiveness); and finally in area number eight, the 
reform measures practically formulate a form of new governance modes, by supporting a Caucasus 
Regional Environmental Centre in order to promote cooperation between state and non-state actors 
(participation).
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With regard to the issue of good governance, the Country Strategy Paper for the period of 2007-
2013 reiterates Armenia’s failures in promoting governance: 
“[R]eform process in the economic sphere has progressed very well in recent years, the re-
form process in the political and institutional sphere has been proceeding on a different 
path; democratic structures and the rule of law should therefore be an important area on 
which cooperation […] could focus” (European Commission 2007a: 9). 
Accordingly, the National Indicative Programme covering the period from 2007 to 2010 per-
forms a significant up-grading of good governance and the broadening of the EU approach 
towards Armenia. The first priority area, for instance, includes several elements, such as the re-
form of the judiciary and the public administration, public finance management and the fight 
against corruption as well as the strengthening of human rights and the civil society (cf. Euro-
pean Commission 2007a). Thus, the formerly strong emphasis on reforming state agencies and 
particularly the executive has been mitigated by integrating the transnational channel to some 
extent. Moreover, reform objectives regarding the rule of law and fundamental freedoms may 
serve both, the strengthening of input- as well as output-legitimacy. Furthermore, in drafting 
the CSP for the period of 2007-2013, the Commission actively consulted civil society organiza-
tions. The strategy paper, however, still does not contain any explicit conditionalities for the 
Armenian authorities with regard to the inclusion of non-state actors.
In a nutshell, the good governance approach of the EU towards Armenia has broadened between 
1992 and 2007. It slightly shifted from promoting effective government to promoting effective 
governance. These modifications have been mainly driven by the incremental introduction of 
the transnational channel after 2000. Input-related objectives are represented only marginally 
and in a more or less formal way by the requirement to improve the electoral code. All in all, 
assistance has constituted the main instrument used by the EU in promoting its reform agenda. 
However, capacity-building has been complemented by the introduction of conditionality and 
political dialogue. The EU has started to make timid use of positive and negative incentives and 
social learning.
Azerbaijan
The implementation of the TACIS programme in Azerbaijan started in 1992. As in the case of 
Armenia, in the early 1990s TACIS complemented other assistance programmes such as hu-
manitarian or food security assistance. Until December 2006, Azerbaijan received a total of € 
409.16 million under the various EU assistance programmes.19 Early TACIS assistance focused 
on legal and institutional support, the energy sector, enterprise restructuring and the develop-
ment of infrastructure. In general, EU assistance to Azerbaijan served the purpose to enhance 
19 This includes TACIS national allocations (28.47%), exceptional macro-financial assistance (7.33%), hu-
manitarian aid (22.51%), European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (16.06%), FSP (18.82%), 
rehabilitation (4.49%), and exceptional humanitarian aid (2.32%).
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the capacities of governmental actors to advance the ongoing economic transition. Thus, as in 
the case of Armenia, the EU initially followed a strong effective government approach.
In 1999, the EU-Azerbaijan PCA introduced the instruments of political dialogue and conditio-
nality (essential elements clause) as well. Assistance, however, still remained the primary instru-
ment. Parallel to Armenia, the Country Strategy Paper and two national indicative programmes 
provided the general guidelines and principles for the supporting reforms in Azerbaijan. Nati-
onal allocations to Azerbaijan amounted to a total of € 44 million for the period 2002 - 2006. 
The CSP 2002-2006 identified corruption as the primary governance problem Azerbaijan was 
required to tackle. In fact, good governance was narrowed down to the fight against corrupti-
on in the private sector by linking it to the areas of market economy, business climate, public 
finance and expenditure (European Commission 2001b: 12).20 As in the case of Armenia, the 
major part of the TACIS national allocations was dedicated to the Azerbaijan Policy and Legal 
Advice Centre (AZPLAC). The centre was designed to provide expertise and political advice for 
the Government of Azerbaijan. Finally, the reform objectives targeted the education system 
as well (cf. European Commission 2001b). In contrast to Armenia, however, the EU explicitly 
refrained from using the transnational channel in this area. Instead, it preferred a strong inter-
governmental approach addressing ”central government” institutions (European Commission 
2001b: 20). Hence, the beneficiaries of assistance were the ‘Ministries of Justice, Foreign Af-
fairs, Environment, the State Statistical Committee and various higher education institutes’ (cf. 
European Commission 2001b). Further reform goals concentrated on improving the business 
climate by developing strategies in order to approximate the regulatory environment to EU and 
WTO standards.21 Again, beneficiaries mainly included government agencies, such as the Mi-
nistries of Economic Development and Fuel and Energy as well as the customs administration. 
By sharp contrast to Armenia, assistance had not been made conditional on the inclusion of or 
dialogue with the civil society at all.
The second NIP covering the period from 2004-2006 recognized the “increasing respect for 
democracy, rule of law, and human rights” in Azerbaijan (European Commission 2003d: 3). Wi-
despread corruption, however, remained a strong point of critique. Consequently, the focus 
of the EU’s engagement was similar to that of the previous NIP. Thus “implementation of the 
PCA, reducing corruption in part through improving governance [and] improving the business 
climate” (European Commission 2003d: 3) remained prevalent.
Furthermore, the Commission added support for improving border management, the targe-
ting of social assistance, and environmental governance. The focus of assistance also included 
20 However, the CSP generally confirms the political will [!] of the GoAZ to fight corruption through the 
Presidential Anti-Corruption Programme: “The gradual process of improving transparency in all leg-
islation and the consequent decisions taken by officials is beginning to have impact. Top-down efforts 
to improve dialogue between the business community and the highest levels of government shows 
that progress is being made, albeit slow” (cf. European Commission 2001b: 10).
21 Part of this reform agenda had been defined due to wishes from the EU-business community. Cf. Eu-
ropean Commission (2001b).
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the modernisation of the tax system and the development of a vocational training strategy. In 
stark contrast to the gradual switch to the transnational channel that took place in Armenia, the 
inclusion of non-state actors in Azerbaijan was neither demanded nor were non-state actors 
targeted by ENPI assistance. Moreover, in the period of 2000-2006 no EIDHR projects were 
conducted in Azerbaijan.22 With regard to governance-related conditionality the Commission 
did not specify other criteria than those of the PCA. Compared to the case of Armenia, the EU 
deviates with regard to both its governance approach and instruments. In Azerbaijan, the EU 
over time continued to rely almost exclusively on the intergovernmental channel, aiming at the 
improvement of the effectiveness and efficiency of state institutions. The strong and unchan-
ged effective government approach and the narrow focus on the fight against corruption confined 
to the economic sector may be traced back to the dominance of multinational companies in the 
energy sector.
As in the case of Armenia, the priorities of the ENP Action Plan were based on a Country Report, 
which the Commission had issued in 2005. By comparison to earlier documents, the CR more 
strongly voiced critique about weak governance in various spheres. The report inter alia pin-
pointed shortcomings in elections, the lacking separation of powers, persisting human rights 
problems, and, as before, widespread corruption (cf. European Commission 2005b). With regard 
to the latter, the Commission acknowledged the signing and ratification of several anti-corrup-
tion conventions (UN, Council of Europe, GRECO) as well as the development of an anti-cor-
ruption legal framework and the adoption of a State Programme on Fighting Corruption (cf. 
European Commission 2005b). Yet, as in Armenia, the legal provisions criminalising corruption 
were deemed insufficient to fully meet the requirements of international standards (European 
Commission 2005b: 7). Accordingly, the Commission asked for further state action in the fight 
against corruption, particularly in the areas of money laundering, civil service, and the tax sys-
tem, as well as in the regulatory framework on the private sector development, privatisation, 
and land reform (European Commission 2005b).
Similar to Armenia, the priorities for action of the ENP Action Plan reflect these desiderata. 
Thus the AP contains a series of reform objectives including transparency in the management 
of Azerbaijan’s oil revenues and privatisation process.
Compared to Armenia, number, order and focus of the priority areas in the Azerbaijan Action 
Plan23 differ considerably. The most striking fact is that the Karabakh issue features so promi-
nently.24 As in the case of Armenia, none of the priority areas makes direct references to good 
governance. Nonetheless, the AP of Azerbaijan entails a number of governance-related issues 
22 EIDHR funded only one regional project, establishing anti-corruption resource centers in the late 
1990s.
23 EU/Azerbaijan Action Plan, adopted November 14, 2006 [hereafter: AP AZ 2006].
24 Already in their negotiation process the ENP Action Plans between the EU and the South Caucasus 
faced a series of problems caused by the conflicts between Azerbaijan and the EU member state Cy-
prus. Even more important for the delay was the insistence of the Azerbaijani authorities on a para-
graph stipulating the territorial integrity of the country.
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as for instance the strengthening of democratic institutions and the separation of powers. This 
goal includes institutional reforms in order to ensure checks and balances between the execu-
tive and the legislative (horizontal separation of powers) as well as the devolution and decen-
tralisation of government bodies on the horizontal level (AP AZ 2006). Priority area three bears 
reference to the governance-related issues of the rule of law and civil society development. The 
specific objectives in the area of the rule of law mainly target the independence, impartiality, 
and efficiency of the judiciary. Interestingly, priority area three also requires the Azerbaijani 
government to actively promote the growth of civil society organisations with capacity building 
measures and to alleviate the cumbersome registration procedures for NGOs (AP AZ 2006). The 
issue of corruption, which had figured so prominently in TACIS documents and the Country 
Report 2005, comes “only” in fourth place. The corresponding reform objectives remain focused 
on improving the legal framework for the fight against corruption (cf. AP AZ 2006). In addition, 
transparency initiatives are required particularly in the energy sector regarding the privatisa-
tion process, tax code (definition of administrative structures, procedures and policies), tax-col-
lecting system (public awareness strategies to ensure tax compliance; implementation of a fiscal 
control strategy as well as auditing and investigation methods). A further peculiarity of the AP 
Azerbaijan is priority area nine, which calls for a strengthened EU-Azerbaijan bilateral energy 
cooperation and regional energy transport cooperation (AP AZ 2006).
In sum, the Action Plan primarily includes prescriptions for improving governance by incre-
asing output legitimacy. Although the plan defines reform objectives that focus on the trans-
parency and accountability of state institutions, this approach remains rather marginal and 
formal. Moreover, the transnational channel figures much less prominently than in the case 
of Armenia and Georgia. The involvement of non-state actors is explicitly provided for only in 
the Karabakh conflict resolution and the educational sector. Although the AP generally requires 
the Azerbaijani authorities to promote the growth of civil society and its organised forms, co-
operation is neither made conditional nor directly funded. Thus, the AP continues to promote 
effective government in the first place without mitigating either its strong output orientation or 
its mostly exclusive intergovernmental approach.
In 2007, the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument replaced the TACIS programme. In 
line with the new budget, the Commission has allocated € 92 million for Azerbaijan for the pe-
riod of 2007-2010. The ENPI Country Strategy Paper for 2007-2013 reiterates the issue of bad go-
vernance (cf. European Commission 2007b). Particularly, the problem of widespread corruption 
figures prominently. However, the CSP in a way also acknowledges Azerbaijan’s “evolutionary 
reform strategy to develop democracy and market economy” (European Commission 2007b: 3).
Most interestingly, the document aims at explaining the emphasis on the intergovernmental 
channel of the previous years (European Commission 2007b: 17). Accordingly, it attempts to jus-
tify the strong ‘top-down’ approach as a consequence of the “need for institution building” and, 
partly, of “an insufficient sense of ownership on the part of the national authorities” (European 
Commission 2007b: 17). However, lack of ownership is considered less severe in the case of the 
Azerbaijani authorities than in other TACIS countries. While the CSP still refers to the indis-
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pensability to democratise, improve fundamental rights and develop independent media and 
the civil society, the assistance priorities do not reflect a real change in the output orientation 
or the strong intergovernmental channel.
Hence, most of EU assistance under ENPI continues to aim at increasing effectiveness and 
efficiency rather than inclusion or even participation. Under ENPI the EU largely continues 
supporting effective government, mainly by technical and financial assistance. Finally, negative 
conditionality remains a (general) principle of the cooperation but has never been invoked.
In sum, the EU’s approaches and instruments to promote good governance in Azerbaijan have 
varied less than in Armenia. The EU has largely stuck to the effective government approach, which 
was only complemented by some minor elements of effective governanceanddemocratic govern-
ment in the AP. The transnational channel remains comparatively underdeveloped, even though 
there is some recognition of the importance of this channel both in the AP and in the pro-
gramming of ENPI. In general, the EU has mainly concentrated on the improvement of the 
business environment and related governance issues, which may reflect the greater importance 
of Azerbaijan as a trading partner and market for European companies. Assistance and poli-
tical dialogue have been the central instruments for these purposes. By contrast, the EU has 
refrained from invoking or even specifying conditionality criteria, despite the weak governance 
performance of Azerbaijan.
However, the pervasiveness of corruption, the lack of state capacities, as well as the deficient 
democratic institutions would have suggested a much stronger focus of the EU on effective 
governance or even on democratic governance. The deviation may be due to the fact that Azer-
baijan is less dependent on the “good will” of the EU given its growing economic strength. 
The decreasing dependence on foreign assistance enables the Azerbaijani authorities to elu-
de pressure by the international community and to barter and bargain much more forcefully 
than Armenia or Georgia are in a position to do. In addition, the strategy of diversification of 
energy resources in order to reduce dependence from the Russian Federation and the Middle 
East has recently gained momentum in the EU member states. This is also corroborated by the 
Commission’s increasing efforts to establish an EU wide common energy strategy (European 
Commission 2006a).
Georgia
Similar to Armenia and Azerbaijan, the engagement of the EU in Georgia started with the pro-
vision of assistance through TACIS and other aid programmes.25 In the early 1990s, Georgia 
was plagued by civil war and political turmoil which resulted in a low share of TACIS funds 
25 Overall, Community assistance for Georgia between 1992 and 2006 amounted to € 505 million. Almost 
26% of the total amount had been provided by the TACIS programme, 20% by ECHO, 12% had been 
food aid, 20% by the Food Security Programme and another 13 % had been macro-financial assistance. 
Additional 9% came from other programmes.
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compared to other sources of assistance that responded to more urgent needs of the popu-
lation, such as food aid or humanitarian assistance. TACIS funds had mainly been used for 
supporting the transition of the Georgian economy and the management and development of 
basic infrastructure. Between 1992 and 1998, the TACIS programme focused on the following 
areas: privatisation, the development of financial and capital markets as well as enterprises, ag-
riculture, transport and energy. Measures taken included reviewing management practises, le-
gislative frameworks, issuing pilot studies and the provision of advice and trainings (European 
Commission 1998). The major rationale was to increase planning and policy implementation 
capacities at various state agencies, but also newly established enterprises as well as those that 
were (formerly) owned by the state. In general, EU engagement in Georgia during the 1990s 
corresponded to an effective government approach primarily promoted through assistance.
As in the cases of Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1999, the PCA between the EU and Georgia entered 
into force and significantly expanded the toolkit of the EU and the depth of relations. Since 
then, political dialogue has been institutionalised and subsequently expanded. Additionally, the 
EU introduced safeguard clauses on the state of the democratic development, the rule of law 
and human rights. The focus on output-related reforms to be carried out by the government 
prevailed at this stage. Furthermore, compared to Armenia and Azerbaijan, the PCA displays 
only minor variation in scope and issues. Until 2003, assistance remained the most important 
instrument to promote good governance in Georgia. The TACIS programme ought to support 
the implementation of the PCA and related governance reforms. As the Commission referred 
to Georgia as a developing country in the Country Strategy Paper of 2001, poverty reduction and 
food security became equally important (cf. European Commission 2001c). As in the case of Ar-
menia, the EU recognized a “paramount” (European Commission 2001c:5) need for improving 
the business climate and fighting corruption. According to the Commission, corruption and 
poor law enforcement even hampered the effective implementation of some assistance projects 
(European Commission 2001c). The NIP 2002-2003 provided € 14 million for Georgia. It mainly 
facilitated the implementation of the PCA, particularly with regard to legal approximation. This 
included further capacity building measures for the Georgian-European Policy Legal Advice 
Centre (GEPLAC), which was founded as early as 1997. Other measures concerned technical 
assistance for the implementation of the Food Security Programme, reforms in the health sec-
tor and of the Georgian border guards (European Commission 2001c). All measures primarily 
served capacity building purposes and targeted state actors, including the Governmental Com-
mission on EU-Georgia Partnership and Cooperation, ministries and agencies concerned by 
the FSP such as the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Health, Labour, and Social Affairs as 
well as ministries related to border control. Other priority areas in the NIP target the health and 
transport sectors (cf. European Commission 2001c). Regarding the various sub-priorities, the 
CSP formulates additional conditionalities linked to the provision of assistance.26 As in the case 
of Armenia, they emphasise, among other things, the necessary commitment of the authorities. 
Cooperation or participation of non-state actors was not made subject to conditionality in any 
26 The Country Strategy Paper for Georgia, covering the assistance-programming period from 2002 to 
2006, furthermore reiterates the common values “respect for democratic principles, the rule of law and 
human rights”, which are subject to conditionality in the PCA.
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case. Thus, the governance-related provisions of the CSP of 2001 are clearly about promoting ef-
fective government, mainly through financial and technical assistance. The transnational channel 
was only strengthened through the provision of EIDHR-funds since 2002.27
In 2003, the approach of the European Union towards Georgia fundamentally changed. The 
significant worsening of the security situation, in particular for foreigners, and the dubious 
role of state actors28 contributed to a complete replacement of the CSP for 2002-2006. The re-
vised CSP for the period from 2003 to 2006 openly referred to “serious problems of governance 
and continued weak rule of law, including high levels of corruption” (European Commission 
2003b: 3) and casted doubt on the commitment to reform of parts of the government. The ins-
truments and channels used by the EU to promote good governance in Georgia reflect a subs-
tantial shift towards the application of negative conditionality and a significant strengthening 
of the transnational channel. Continuation of assistance had been restricted to projects that 
were likely to reach their objectives due to a real commitment of the authorities. Additionally, 
the focus of TACIS funding partly shifted from state actors to non-state actors such as “NGOs, 
independent media, local communities, small business etc.” (European Commission 2003b: 4). 
The scope of measures became broader and much more governance-related, particularly in 
the first area of intervention. It still embraced legal approximation and implementation of the 
PCA, now in particular with respect to customs legislation and further capacity building to GE-
PLAC. Besides, the NIP highlights under the same general headline assistance for judiciary and 
law enforcement reforms as well as strengthening civil society and human rights. With regard 
to the judiciary, assistance is scheduled for “addressing identified shortcomings in the whole 
chain: police investigation, prosecution, successful conviction and imprisonment” (European 
Commission 2003b: 29). Accordingly, the targeted state agencies include the prosecution aut-
hority, the penitentiary system, police and customs, and the border guards. An important point 
regarding these reform measures was the insistence of the Commission that both formal (e.g. 
human rights commissions, ombudsman) and informal civil oversight mechanisms (advocacy 
from civil society) were to be promoted (European Commission 2003b: 29). A similar point was 
made with view to PCA related reforms.
The third main intervention area, the strengthening of civil society and human rights, most 
clearly reflects the quite significant shift towards the transnational channel. This subsection 
of the NIP aimed at empowering NGOs mostly by capacity building measures of various sort, 
but also at improving their legal status (European Commission 2003b). The same section rein-
forces the demand of the Commission on the Georgian authorities to generally involve NGOs 
in governance-related reform measures, such as “public administration reform, including ju-
dicial reform and the implementation of rule of law” (European Commission 2003b: 31). The 
27 The Commission allocated between 2002 and 2006 € 2 million annually through EIDHR for Geor-
gia.
28 In at least two cases staff from the delegation of the Commission or associated partners fell victim 
to crimes: In 2001 a German official of the Commission delegation to Georgia was murdered and in 
2002 a British banker implementing projects funded by the EU was kidnapped for several months (cf. 
Lomadze 2002).
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second priority area, tackling the social consequences of transition, flanked the general pover-
ty reduction strategy of Georgia, and aimed at enhancing local community-based governance, 
services and infrastructure in order to improve food security and rural business opportunities. 
To almost every sub-priority the Commission attached additional conditionalities, the most 
important of which are commitment and political will of the Georgian authorities and the 
involvement of civil society actors. In sum, the revised CSP for Georgia strongly complements 
effective government with effective and even democratic governance. Furthermore, the introduction 
of negative conditionality due to governance failures is unique compared to both the Southern 
Caucasus states.
It is, however, difficult to assess to what extent the conditions and prescriptions of the NIP 
2003-2006 really materialised. Only two month after the adoption of the document, the Rose 
Revolution brought about an unexpected change of leadership in Georgia that was welcomed 
by the EU. In 2004, a major donor conference supported the reform agenda of the new Ge-
orgian government by gathering additional assistance amounting to € 850 million. The EU 
consequently set up a supplementary Action Programme for 2004. In the introductory “country 
update” it acknowledged the “strong commitment of the [new] Georgian Government to de-
mocratic reforms, with the aim of enhancing political stability, the rule of law and economic 
normalisation in the country” (European Commission 2004b: 1). For this reason, restrictions 
on assistance had been lifted and additional funding for the apparently reform-minded go-
vernment allocated. Additional measures to be taken under the first priority area identified in 
the CSP included support for reforms of the Ministry of Justice, the Parliament, customs and 
tax administration reform and the establishment of a Centre for European Studies in the State 
University of Tbilisi. In the second priority area additional funds were allocated for the support 
of child welfare reforms. The document did neither reiterate the conditionality criteria of the 
NIP nor the strong demand to involve civil society. Thus, the EU largely switched back to the 
promotion of effective government in 2004.
The Country Report of 2005, on the basis of which the EU-Georgia ENP Action Plan had sub-
sequently been drafted, repeated the notion of “a strong commitment of the [new] Georgian 
authorities to implement their reform plans notably in the field of good governance”. In addi-
tion, the CR once again referred to “the new authorities anti-corruption drive” (European Com-
mission 2005c: 10). Corruption, however, was still considered a serious problem in particular 
in the education system, customs, and the energy sector. Other concerns pointed to the lacking 
independence of the judiciary, of the media, and the ill treatment of detainees. The EU/Georgia 
Action Plan has been adopted on 14 November 200629 as in the cases of Armenia and Azerbai-
jan. Though not directly referred to in the headlines of the various priority areas, the AP for 
Georgia contains the broadest scope of governance-related reforms. In this respect, the agenda 
among other things comprises the strengthening of democratic institutions, reforms with re-
gard to the judicial system, civil services, local government, business-related laws, the customs 
code and administration, the tax administration, privatisation and licensing (cf. AP GE 2006). 
29 EU/Georgia Action Plan, adopted 14 November, 2006 [hereafter: AP GE 2006]. 
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Fighting corruption figures most prominently in priority area two, which aims at improving 
the business and investment climate and includes demands for transparency in privatisation 
processes, licensing, and the implementation of the Georgian government’s anti-corruption 
strategy. Another reference to fighting corruption is made in the complementary section “Ge-
neral Objectives and Action”. In the subsection “Political Dialogue and Reform” there is an 
extra paragraph on the issue that demands the signing and ratifying of additional internatio-
nal conventions,30 the development and implementation of specific anti-corruption measures 
within the judiciary and the law enforcement agencies, and progress with regard to the imple-
mentation of GRECO recommendations (cf. AP GE 2006). The reform agenda laid out in the AP 
almost entirely focuses on measures carried out within or through state actors. However, civil 
society inclusion is recommended with respect to the implementation of the government’s 
anti-corruption strategy, to the resolution of internal conflicts as well as higher and vocational 
education and environmental governance. It is an open question whether these suggestions are 
still linked to conditionality or not. In sum, the integration of Georgia into the ENP framework 
brought about a combination of different approaches. The EU’s reform prescriptions cover our 
effectiveanddemocratic government dimensions as well as effective governance.
As in the cases of Armenia and Azerbaijan, the new financial perspective 2007-2013 brought 
about a sharp increase in assistance for Georgia. In the financial period of 2007-2010 the ENPI 
indicative budget for Georgia amounts to € 120.4 million. The NIP 2007-2010 lists three priority 
areas for the programming of assistance (European Commission 2007c). There are striking si-
milarities to the cases of Armenia and Azerbaijan, particularly in regards to the first two priority 
areas. As in the two other Southern Caucasus countries, the EU integrated support for reforms 
regarding the strengthening of the rule of law, administrative capacity building, public finance 
management and the development of civil society. However, the fostering of dialogue between 
state and non-state actors as well as the inclusion of civil society actors in decision-making pro-
cesses is also part of the reform agenda (European Commission 2007c). Thus, compared to TA-
CIS, the new assistance programme more explicitly includes the transnational channel in the 
Georgian case. Furthermore, envisaged reforms aim at increasing input-legitimacy even more 
strongly than in Armenia. Whether and to what extent this broadening of the good governance 
approach will be reflected in the EU’s distribution of funds, remains an open question. So far 
we at least rhetorically observe a cautious broadening of the good governance approach from 
effective government in all directions – to effective governance,democratic governmentanddemocratic 
governance.
In conclusion, promoting good governance in the case of Georgia in many respects deviates 
from Armenia and Azerbaijan. Until 2003 the EU largely concentrated on promoting effective 
government. Due to governance failures the Commission revised the CSP in 2003, introducing 
negative conditionality and partly switching to the transnational channel. This unique shift, 
however, hardly materialised as the Rose Revolution brought about a change in leadership. The 
30 These include the UN Convention on Corruption, relevant articles of UNTOC, the CoE Criminal Law 
Convention on Corruption, the Civil Law Convention on Corruption and the OECD Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. 
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Commission reacted by appreciating the efforts of the new government to improve governance 
and curb widespread corruption, and largely switched back to its original approach. The Action 
Plan of Georgia, however, appears to be more ambitious than in the cases of Armenia and Azer-
baijan when it comes to governance-related reforms. Nevertheless, in general the emphasis on 
increasing output-legitimacy and the intergovernmental channel has returned. Thus, promo-
ting good governance in Georgia with the exception of the CSP 2003 means promoting effective 
government with complementary elements of effectiveanddemocratic governance. Since the adop-
tion of the AP and the establishment of ENPI, even some inceptions of promoting democratic 
government have emerged.
4. Conclusions
This paper aimed at shedding light on the EU’s efforts to promote good governance in the 
Southern Caucasus. In chapter two, we developed an analytical framework to systematically 
map the different concepts, the channels of influence and the instruments used by the EU in 
promoting good governance. Chapter three used this framework to trace the EU’s approach 
with view to the general framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy and to its activities 
in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.
Our empirical analysis of the ENP shows that the EU has indeed developed a “one-size-fits-all” 
approach for its Eastern neighbours. Our country studies also reveal that the EU’s good gover-
nance approach varies over time as well as across countries. Initially, the EU’s involvement in 
the Southern Caucasus placed strong emphasis on promoting effective government. This is 
hardly surprising given the rapid economic decline in most of the NIS following the liberali-
sation policies in the early 1990s. Moreover, the economic crisis made humanitarian assistance 
through ECHO or Food Aid an equally important priority. 
With the further institutionalization of its relations with the Southern Caucasus, the EU’s ap-
proach started to generally broaden towards effective governance by increasingly encouraging 
the involvement of non-state actors in the reform processes. This trend has been most prono-
unced in Georgia, and to a lesser extent in Armenia, while in Azerbaijan, the use of transnatio-
nal channels has been the most restricted.
This finding appears to corroborate once more the “one-size-fits-all” approach of the EU in its 
external promotion of (good) governance (Börzel/Risse forthcoming). However, a closer look at 
the country level reveals that the EU indeed adopted country-specific approaches taking into 
account the degree of statehood and democracy in the cases of Armenia and Georgia. Moreover, 
the EU also reacted to the changes in democracy and to a lesser extent in statehood that took 
place in Georgia. In line with the medium degree of statehood and democracy in Armenia, the 
EU initially pursued an effective government approach, which opened up toward effective gover-
nance when the transnational channel in the overall ENP framework was strengthened. In Ge-
orgia, the EU’s shift toward effective governance was more pronounced because the EU reacted to 
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governance failures and the major decline in democracy in 2002 by turning to non-state actors. 
With the democratic reforms induced by the Rose Revolution in 2003, however, the EU changed 
its approach once again and returned to its initial approach of promoting effective government. 
Nonetheless, the EU introduced elements of democratic government to its reform agenda in 
response to comparatively greater political freedoms in Georgia.
While Georgia and Armenia largely confirm our theoretical argument, Azerbaijan has not met 
our expectations. Instead of adopting a stronger focus on effective governance that would re-
sonate with the persistently bad record on democracy, the EU has clung to its initial approach 
of promoting effective government. This deviation may be explained by the “energy factor”. 
On the one hand, Azerbaijan’s energy resources render the country less dependent on external 
assistance (resource dependency). On the other hand, the EU’s interest in energy security im-
pairs its ability to resort to conditionality. It also prevents the EU from pushing too hard for its 
reform agenda through transnational channels since up to the present the Azerbaijani govern-
ment has successfully counteracted any attempts of the EU to establish strong direct relations 
with non-state actors that could undermine its power. Figure 10 summarises our findings.
Figure 10: Empirical findings
In a nutshell, our findings strongly suggest that the EU applies a two-pronged strategy with 
regard to its Eastern Neighbourhood. It adopts a “one-size-fits-all” approach in the general po-
licy framework that is spelled out and complemented by a country specific component on the 
ground. Furthermore the specific approaches and instruments account for the country context 
with regard to democracy and statehood. Compared to other external actors, such as the US, 
the EU makes only cautious use of both the transnational channel and conditionality. The EU 
rather seeks to closely cooperate with state actors as long as possible. Moreover, as the Geor-
gian case illustrates, the application of (negative) conditionality seems to be a measure of last 
resort. 
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Lastly, our findings suggest that specific EU interests may mitigate though not overhaul its 
overall approach. In Azerbaijan, economic interests of the EU partly question the coherence 
of its efforts, as the EU refrains from applying those instruments and approaches that would 
increase reform pressure on the Azerbaijani government. The recent war between Georgia and 
Russia over South Ossetia may lead to a similar shift of the EU’s focus on promoting good 
governance towards promoting security and economic interests. Thus, the question whether 
the ENP can “achieve compliance” (Magen 2006) with regard to good governance does not only 
depend on the approaches and instruments in principle available to the EU but also on its wil-
lingness to effectively make use of them.
Literature
Adam, Markus 2001: Governance als Ansatz der Vereinten Nationen. Das Beispiel des UNDP, 
in: Adam, Markus/König, Klaus (Eds.): Governance als entwicklungspolitischer Ansatz. 
Forschungssymposium vom 29. bis 30. September 2000, Speyer, 18-33.
Beck, Daniel/Conzelmann, Thomas 2004: Zwischen Sanktionierung und Dialog. Die Durchsetzung 
von Good Governance in der Entwicklungspartnerschaft von EU und AKP (IINS Paper), 
Mannheim.
Bertelsmann Stiftung 2005: Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2006, Gütersloh, in: http://bti2006.
bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/11.0.html?&L=1%3B&L=1; 5 December 2008.
Bertelsmann Stiftung 2007: Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2008, Gütersloh, in: http://www.
bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/11.0.html; 5 December 2008.
Bicchi, Federica 2006: “Our Size Fits All”: Normative Power Europe and the Mediterranean, in: 
Journal of European Public Policy 13: 2, 286-303.
Börzel, Tanja A./Pamuk, Yasemin/Stahn, Andreas 2007: Good Goverance in the European Union, 
in: Berliner Arbeitspapiere zur Europäischen Integration, Center of European Studies, 
Freie Universität Berlin 07: 5.
Börzel, Tanja A./Risse, Thomas (forthcoming): Venus Approaching Mars? The European Union’s 
Approaches to Democracy Promotion, in: McFaul, Michael/Magen, Amichai/Risse, Tho-
mas (Eds.): Democracy Promotion in the US and the EU Compared, Houndmills.
Burnell, Peter 2000: Democracy Assistance: International Cooperation for Democratization, Lon-
don.
Carothers, Thomas 2002: The End of the Transition Paradigm, in: Journal of Democracy 13: 1.
Carothers, Thomas 2004: Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion, Washington D.C.
Carothers, Thomas 2006: Confronting the Weakest Link: Aiding Political Parties in New Democ-
racies, Washington D.C.
Chayes, Abram/Chayes, Antonia Handler 1993: On Compliance, in: International Organization 47: 
2, 175-205.
Chayes, Abram/Chayes, Antonia Handler/Mitchell, Ronald B. 1998: Managing Compliance: A Com-
parative Perspective, in: Weiss, Edith Brown/Jacobsen, Harold K. (Eds.): Engaging Coun-
tries: Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Accords, Cam-
bridge, 39-62.
SFB-Governance Working Paper Series • No. 18 • December 2008 |  37
Checkel, Jeffrey T. 2001: Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change, in: Inter-
national Organization 55: 3, 553-588.
Conzelmann, Thomas 2003: Auf der Suche nach einem Phänomen: Was bedeutet Good Gover-
nance in der europäischen Entwicklungspolitik, in: Nord-Süd-Aktuell 17: 3, 475-477.
Diez, Thomas/Stetter, Stephan/Albert, Matthias 2006: The European Union and Border Conflicts: 
The Transformative Power of Integration, in: International Organization 60: 3, 563-593.
Dolzer, Rudolf 2004: Good Governance: Neues transnationales Leitbild der Staatlichkeit?, in: 
Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 64: 3, 12.
Downs, George W. 1998: Enforcement and the Evolution of Cooperation, in: Michigan Journal of 
International Law 19: 2, 319-344.
European Commission 1998: Mid Term Evaluation of Tacis Activities in Georgia: Evaluation Re-
port (January 1998), Brussels.
European Commission 2001a: Tacis Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006. National Indicative Pro-
gramme 2002-2003. Armenia (27 December 2001), Brussels.
European Commission 2001b: Tacis Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006. National Indicative Pro-
gramme 2002-2003. Azerbaijan (27 December 2001), Brussels.
European Commission 2001c: Tacis Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006. National Indicative Pro-
gramme 2002-2003. Georgia (27 December 2001), Brussels.
European Commission 2003a: Communication from the Commission to the Council and the Eu-
ropean Parliament. Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations 
with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours, (COM (2003) 104 final); 11.03.2003.
European Commission 2003b: Tacis Country Strategy Paper 2003-2006. National Indicative Pro-
gramme 2004-2006. Georgia (23 September 2003), Brussels.
European Commission 2003c: Tacis National Indicative Programme 2004-2006. Armenia (18 Sep-
tember 2003), Brussels.
European Commission 2003d: Tacis National Indicative Programme 2004-2006. Azerbaijan (22 
May 2003), Brussels.
European Commission 2004a: European Neighbourhood Policy. Strategy Paper (COM (2004) 373 
final, 12.05.2004), Brussels.
European Commission 2004b: Tacis Action Programme for Georgia - Part II (16/17 June 2004 ), 
Brussels.
European Commission 2005a: Commission Staff Working Paper, Annex to: European Neighbour-
hood Policy. Country Report Armenia (COM (2005) 72 final, 2 March 2005), Brussels.
European Commission 2005b: Commission Staff Working Paper, Annex to: European Neighbour-
hood Policy. Country Report Azerbaijan (COM (2005) 72 final, 2 March 2005), Brussels.
European Commission 2005c: Commission Staff Working Paper, Annex to: European Neighbour-
hood Policy. Country Report Georgia (COM (2005) 72 final, 2 March 2005), Brussels.
European Commission 2006a: Green Paper: A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and 
Secure Energy, Brussels.
European Commission 2006b: On Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy (COM 
(2006) 726 final, 4 December 2006), Brussels.
European Commission 2007a: European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument. Armenia. 
Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013, Brussels.
One Size Fits All? |  38
European Commission 2007b: European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument. Azerbaijan. 
Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013, Brussels.
European Commission 2007c: European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument. Georgia. 
National Indicative Programme 2007-2010, Brussels.
European Commission 2007d: A Strong European Neighbourhood Policy (COM (2007) 774 final, 5 
December 2007), Brussels.
Fearon, James D. 1998: Bargaining, Enforcement and International Cooperation, in: Internation-
al Organization 52: 2, 269-305.
Frank, Björn 2004: Zehn Jahre empirische Korruptionsforschung, in: Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirt-
schaftsforschung 73: 2, 184-199.
Freedom House 2008: Freedom in the World 1973-2008, in: http://www.freedomhouse.org/tem-
plate.cfm?page=15; 5 December 2008.
Fuster, Thomas 1998: Die „Good Governance“ Diskussion der Jahre 1989 bis 1994. Ein Beitrag zur 
jüngeren Geschichte der Entwicklungspolitik unter spezieller Berücksichtigung der 
Weltbank und des DAC, Bern.
Héritier, Adrienne 2003: New Modes of Governance in Europe: Increasing Political Capacity and 
Policy Effectiveness?, in: Börzel, Tanja A./Cichowski, Rachel (Eds.): The State of the Eu-
ropean Union, 6 - Law, Politics, and Society, Oxford, 105-126.
Hill, Hermann 2006: Good Governance - Konzepte und Kontexte, in: Schuppert, Gunnar Fol-
ke (Ed.): Governance-Forschung. Vergewisserung über Stand und Entwicklungslinien, 
Baden-Baden, 220-247.
Johnston, Michael 1999: Corruption and Democratic Consolidation (Conference on Democracy 
and Corruption, Shelby Cullom Davis Center for Historical Studies Princeton Univer-
sity, 12 March 1999), in: http://209.85.135.104/search?q=cache:hTnWoNGw6mIJ:people.
colgate.edu/mjohnston/MJ%2520papers%252001/Princeton.pdf; 5 December 2008.
Johnston, Michael 2005: Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power and Democracy, Cambridge.
Jünemann, Annette/Knodt, Michele 2007: Explaining EU-Instruments and Strategies of EU De-
mocracy Promotion, in: Jünemann, Annette/Knodt, Michele (Eds.): Externe Demokra-
tieförderung durch die Europäische Union. European External Democracy Promotion, 
Baden-Baden, 353-369.
Karklins, Ramsa 2005: The System Made Me Do It: Corruption in Post-Communist Societies, 
New York.
Kaufmann, Daniel/Kray, Aart/Mastruzzi, Massimo 2007: Governance Matters VII: Governance In-
dicators for 1996-2007 (World Bank Policy Reserach Working Paper 4654, 24 June 2005), 
Washington.
Kekic, Laza 2007: The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy, London, in: http://
www.economist.com/media/pdf/Democracy_Index_2007_v3.pdf; 5 December 2008.
Kelley, Judith 2005: New Wine in Old Wineskins: Policy Learning and Adaptation in the new Eu-
ropean Neighbourhood Policy, Durham.
Khan, Mushtaq H. 2006: Governance and Anti-Corruption Reforms in Developing Countries: 
Policies, Evidence and Ways Forward, in: United Nations G-24 Discussion Paper Series 
42.
SFB-Governance Working Paper Series • No. 18 • December 2008 |  39
Kitschelt, Herbert/Wilkinson, Steven I. 2007: A Research Agenda for the Study of Citizen-Politician 
Linkages and Democratic Accountability, in: Kitschelt, Herbert/Wilkinson, Steven I. 
(Eds.): Patron, Clients and Policies. Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political 
Competition, Camebridge, 323-343.
König, Klaus 2001: Zur Steuerungs- und Werteproblematik, in: Adam, Markus/König, Klaus 
(Eds.): Governance als entwicklungspolitischer Ansatz, Speyer, 189-199.
Kopstein, Jeffrey 2005: The Transatlantic Divide over Democracy Promotion, in: The Washington 
Quarterly 29: 2, 85-96.
Ladwig, Bernd/Jugov, Tamara/Schmelzle, Cord 2007: Governance, Normativität und begrenzte Staat-
lichkeit (SFB-Working Paper Series, No. 4, 2007-02), Berlin.
Lomadze, Giorgi 2002: Georgian Kidnapping: A Deadly Trend (CRS No 135, 27 June 2002), in: 
http://www.iwpr.net/?p=crs&s=f&o=160559&apc_state=henicrs2002; 5 December 2008.
Magen, Amichai 2006: The Shadow of Enlargement: Can the European Union Neighbourhood 
Policy Achieve Compliance?, in: Columbia Journal of European Law 12: 2, 495-538.
Magen, Amichai/Morlino, Leonardo (Eds.) 2008: Anchoring Democracy: External Influence on Do-
mestic Rule of Law Development, London.
Manzetti, Luigi 2007: Why Do Corrupt Governments Maintain Public Support, in: Comparative 
Political Studies 40: 8, 949-970.
Mauro, Paolo 1995: Corruption and Growth, in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics 10: 3, 681-
712.
Mayntz, Renate/Scharpf, Fritz W. 1995: Der Ansatz des akteurszentrierten Institutionalismus in: 
Mayntz, Renate/Scharpf, Fritz W. (Eds.): Gesellschaftliche Selbstregulierung und politi-
sche Steuerung, Frankfurt/Main, 39-72.
McFaul, Michael 2004-2005: Democracy Promotion as a World Value, in: The Washington Quar-
terly 28: 1, 147-163.
Mendelson, Sarah/Glenn, John 2002: The Power and Limits of NGOs, New York.
Menzel, Ulrich 1995: Geschichte der Entwicklungstheorie. Einführung und systematische Biblio-
graphie, Hamburg.
Murphy, Emma C. 2002: Good Governance: Ein universal anwendbares Konzept?, in: Internatio-
nale Politik 57: 8, 1-9.
OECD/DAC 1995: Participatory Development and Good Governance, Paris.
Offe, Claus 1991: Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory Facing the Triple Tran-
sition in East Central Europe, in: Social Research 58: 4, 865-892.
Ottaway, Marina/Carothers, Thomas 2000: Funding Virtue: Civil Society Aid and Democracy Pro-
motion, Washington D.C.
Phongpaichit, Pasuk/Baker, Chris 2002: Good Governance, Money Politics, and Honest Mistakes, 
in: http://pioneer.netserv.chula.ac.th/~ppasuk/honestmistakemonash.doc; 5 December 
2008.
Pierre, Jon 1999: Conclusions: Governance Beyond State Strength, in: Pierre, Jon (Ed.): Debating 
Governance: Authority, Steering, and Democracy, Oxford, 241-246.
Raik, Kristi 2006: Promoting Democracy in the Eastern Neighbourhood - The Limits and Poten-
tial of ENP, in: The International Spectator 2006: 3, 31-45.
One Size Fits All? |  40
Rhodes, R. A. W. 1999: Governance and Public Administration, in: Pierre, Jon (Ed.): Debating Gov-
ernance: Authority, Steering, and Democracy, Oxford, 54-90.
Risse, Thomas 1999: International Norms and Domestic Change: Arguing and Communicative 
Behavior in the Human Rights Area, in: Politics and Society 27: 4, 526-556.
Risse, Thomas/Lehmkuhl, Ursula 2007: Regieren ohne Staat? Governance in Räumen begrenzter 
Staatlichkeit, in: Risse, Thomas/Lehmkuhl, Ursula (Eds.): Regieren ohne Staat? Gover-
nance in den Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit, Baden-Baden, 13-40.
Rose-Ackerman, Susan 1996: When is Corruption Harmful?, Washington, D.C.
Scharpf, Fritz W. 1997: Games Real Actors Play. Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Re-
search, Boulder.
Scharpf, Fritz W. 1999: Governing Europe. Effective and Legitimate?, Oxford.
Schimmelfennig, Frank 2007: Europeanization beyond Europe, in: Living Reviews in European 
Governance 1: 1, in: http://www.livingreviews.org/lreg-2007-2001, 5 December 2008.
Scott, James C. 1972: Comparative Political Corruption, New Jersey.
Shen, Ce/Wiliamson, John B. 2005: Corruption, Democracy, Economic Freedom, and State Strength: 
A Cross-national Analysis, in: International Journal of Comparative Sociology 46: 4, 327-
345.
Spinellis, Dionysios 1996: The Phenomenon of Corruption and the Challenge of Good Govern-
ment, OECD Symposium on Corruption and Good Governance, OECD Working Papers 
78, Paris.
Theobald, Christopher 2001: Zehn Eckpunkte zu Good Governance, in: Adam, Markus/König, 
Klaus (Eds.): Governance als entwicklungspolitischer Ansatz. Forschungssymposium 
vom 29. bis 30. September 2000, Speyer, 35-87.
Tolentino, Amando S. 1995: Good Governance Through Popular Participation in Sustainable De-
velopment, in: Ginther, Konrad/Denters, Erik/Waart, Paul J.I.M. de (Eds.): Sustainable 
Development and Good Governance, Dordrecht, 137-149.
Transparency International 2004: Corruption Perceptions Index, in: http://www.transparency.de/
uploads/media/04-10-20_CPI_2004_DEU.pdf; 5 December 2008.
Transparency International 2007: Corruption Perceptions Index, in: http://www.transparency.de/
Tabellarisches-Ranking.1084.0.html; 5 December 2008.
Treisman, Daniel 2000: The Cause of Corruption: A Cross-National Study, in: Journal of Public 
Economics 76: 3, 399-457.
UNDP 2006: Governance for the Future: Democracy and Development in the Least Developed 
Countries. New York.
Vorozheikina, Tatiana 1994: Clientelism and the Process of Political Democratization in Russia, 
in: Roninger, Luis/Günes-Ayata, Ayse (Eds.): Democracy, Clientelism, and Civil Society, 
Boulder, 105-119.
Weiss, Thomas George 2000: Governance, Good Governance and Global Governance: Conceptual 
and Actual Challenges, in: Third World Quarterly 21: 5, 794-814.
World Bank 2000: Anticorruption in Transition. A Contribution to the Policy Debate, Washing-
ton, D. C.
SFB-Governance Working Paper Series • No. 18 • December 2008 |  41
Previously published Working Papers from the SFB-Governance Working Paper Series
Risse, Thomas/Lehmkuhl, Ursula 2006: Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood: New Forms of Governance? 
Research Program or the Research Center (SFB) 700, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 1, 
Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, December 2006. [German version available]
Draude, Anke 2007: How to Capture Non-Western Forms of Governance: In Favour of an Equivalence Functiona-
list Observation of Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, 
No. 2, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, January 2007. [German version available]
Kötter, Matthias 2007: Der Governance-Raum als Analysefaktor – am Beispiel von „Räumen begrenzter Staat-
lichkeit“, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, Nr. 3, DFG Sonderforschungsbereich 700, Berlin, 
Januar 2007.
Ladwig, Bernd/Jugov, Tamara/Schmelzle. Cord 2007: Governance, Normativität und begrenzte Staatlichkeit, SFB-
Governance Working Paper Series, Nr. 4, DFG Sonderforschungsbereich 700, Berlin, Februar 2007.
Risse, Thomas 2007: Regieren in Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit. Zur „Reisefähigkeit“ des Governance-Kon-
zeptes, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, Nr. 5, DFG Sonderforschungsbereich 700, Berlin, April 
2007.
Schäferhoff, Marco/Campe, Sabine/Kaan, Christopher 2007: Transnational Public-Private Partnerships in Inter-
national Relations. Making Sense of Concepts, Research Frameworks and Results, SFB-Governance 
Working Paper Series, No. 6, DFG Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, August 2007.
Koehler, Jan/Zürcher, Christoph 2007: Assessing the Contribution of International Actors in Afghanistan. Results 
from a Representative Survey, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 7, DFG Research Center 
(SFB) 700, Berlin, October 2007.
Sonderforschungsbereich 700 (Hrsg.) 2007: Grundbegriffe. Ein Beitrag aus dem Teilprojekt A1, SFB-Governance 
Working Paper Series, Nr. 8, DFG Sonderforschungsbereich 700, Berlin, Oktober 2007.
Hönke, Jana/Kranz, Nicole/Börzel, Tanja A./Héritier, Adrienne 2008: Fostering Environmental Regulation? Corpo-
rate Social Responsibility in Countries with Weak Regulatory Capacities. The Case of South Africa, SFB-
Governance Working Paper Series, Nr. 9, DFG Sonderforschungsbereich 700, Berlin, February 2008.
Benecke, Gudrun/Friberg, Lars/Lederer, Markus/Schröder, Miriam 2008: From Public-Private Partnership to Market. 
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) as a New Form of Governance in Climate Protection, SFB-
Governance Working Paper Series, No. 10, DFG Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, April 2008.
Trebesch, Christoph 2008: Economic Governance, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, Nr. 11, DFG Sonder-
forschungsbereich 700, Berlin, Mai 2008.
One Size Fits All? |  42
Schuppert, Gunnar Folke 2008: Von Ko-Produktion von Staatlichkeit zur Co-Performance of Governance. Eine 
Skizze zu kooperativen Governance-Strukturen von den Condottieri der Renaissance bis zu Public 
Private Partnerships, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, Nr. 12, DFG Sonderforschungsbereich 
700, Berlin, April 2008.
Benecke, Gudrun/Branović, Željko/Draude, Anke 2008: Governance und Raum. Theoretisch-konzeptionelle Über-
legungen zur Verräumlichung von Governance, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, Nr. 13, DFG 
Sonderforschungsbereich 700, Berlin, Mai 2008.
Beisheim, Marianne/Dingwerth, Klaus 2008: Procedural Legitimacy and Private Transnational Governance. Are 
the Good Ones Doing Better?, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, Nr. 14, DFG Sonderforschungs-
bereich 700, Berlin, June 2008.
Buckley-Zistel, Susanne 2008: Transitional Justice als Weg zu Frieden und Sicherheit. Möglichkeiten und Gren-
zen, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, Nr. 15, DFG Sonderforschungsbereich 700, Berlin, Juli 
2008.
Beisheim, Marianne/Fuhr, Harald (Hrsg.) 2008: Governance durch Interaktion nicht-staatlicher und staatlicher 
Akteure. Entstehungsbedingungen, Effektivität und Legitimität sowie Nachhaltigkeit, SFB-Gover-
nance Working Paper Series, Nr. 16, DFG Sonderforschungsbereich 700, Berlin, August 2008.
Koehler, Jan 2008: Auf der Suche nach Sicherheit. Die internationale Intervention in Nordost-Afghanistan, 
SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, Nr. 17, DFG Sonderforschungsbereich 700, Berlin, November 
2008.
These publications can be downloaded from www.sfb-governance.de/publikationen or ordered in printed ver-
sions via e-mail to sfb700@zedat.fu-berlin.de.
SFB-Governance Working Paper Series • No. 18 • December 2008 |  43
Andreas Stahn is a Research Associ-
ate with the Collaborative Research 
Centre (SFB) 700 “Governance in 
Areas of Limited Statehood”. His 
research focuses on EU and U.S. 
foreign policy, particularly in the 
areas of democracy promotion and 
good governance. Andreas Stahn 
holds degrees in Political Science 
as well as Russian and East European Studies. He is a mem-
ber of the research project B2 “Good Governance without 
the Shadow of Hierarchy? The EU Neighbourhood Policy 
and Anti-Corruption Measures in the Southern Caucasus.” 
Contact: andstahn@zedat.fu-berlin.de
The Authors
Yasemin Pamuk is a Research Asso-
ciate at the Collaborative Research 
Centre (SFB) 700 “Governance in 
Areas of Limited Statehood”. She 
holds degrees in Islamic Studies 
and Political Science from Heidel-
berg University and Turkic Studies 
from Université Marc Bloch Stras-
bourg. Yasemin Pamuk is a mem-
ber of the research project B2 “Good Governance without 
the Shadow of Hierarchy? The EU Neighbourhood Policy 
and Anti-Corruption Measures in the Southern Caucasus”. 
Her PhD focuses on the role of informal institutions in are-
as of limited statehood in the former Soviet Union.
Contact: ypamuk@zedat.fu-berlin.de
Professor Tanja A. Börzel holds the 
Chair for European Integration at 
the Otto-Suhr-Institut for Political 
Science, Freie Universität Berlin. 
She co-directs the Research Col-
lege „The Transformative Power of 
Europe“. She mainly focusses on 
questions of governance and ins-
titutional change as a result of Eu-
ropeanisation as well as on the diffusion of European ideas 
and policies within and outside of the EU. The latter is part 
of her current research, which deals with the compliance 
with EU norms and rules in member states, accession coun-
tries and neighbouring countries. 
Contact: boerzel@zedat.fu-berlin.de
Partner Organisations of the Research Center (SFB) 700
Governance has become a central theme in social science 
research. The Research Center (SFB) 700 Governance in Areas 
of Limited Statehood investigates governance in areas of li-
mited statehood, i.e. developing countries, failing and failed 
states, as well as, in historical perspective, different types of 
colonies. How and under what conditions can governance 
deliver legitimate authority, security, and welfare, and what 
problems are likely to emerge? Operating since 2006 and 
financed by the German Research Foundation (DFG), the 
Research Center involves the Freie Universität Berlin, the 
University of Potsdam, the European University Institute, 
the Hertie School of Governance, the German Institute for 
International and Security Affairs (SWP), and the Social Sci-
ence Research Center Berlin (WZB). 
Research Framework of the Research Center (SFB) 700
Host University
Freie Universität Berlin
University of Potsdam
Hertie School of Governance
German Institute for International and 
Security Affairs (SWP)
Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB)
European University Institute
Florence (EUI)
